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he goal of this special issue of the Economic Policy Review 
is to draw some lessons from the recent crises in Asian and 
other emerging markets that may benefit future decision 
making in the international economy. The articles in the 
volume, written by economists from the International 
Research Function and banking specialists from the Emerging 
Markets and International Affairs Group, are not intended to 
address all issues relevant to currency and banking crises. 
Instead, the authors use detailed data and the rigorous tools of 
economic theory and econometrics to explore select topics: the 
mechanisms for transmission of crises across countries, the role 
of banks in emerging markets, the price and quantity responses 
observed in the trade flows of the crisis countries, and the 
impact of emerging market crises on the aggregate and sectoral 
activities of industrialized countries.
In the opening article of the volume, Paolo Pesenti and 
Cédric Tille summarize the prevailing views on the causes of 
currency crises. The first generation of economic models to 
address these causes attributed currency instability to poor or 
incompatible macroeconomic policies. In this view, large or 
persistent fiscal deficits can be in conflict with a fixed exchange 
rate regime if investors anticipate that the government will 
ultimately resort to printing money to pay off its past debts. 
The second generation of models linked currency instability to 
self-fulfilling private sector expectations of future macro-
economic problems. If investors view a future depreciation 
as likely, capital outflows and lower output will cause a 
devaluation that validates the initial investor concern. 
Pesenti and Tille then proceed to argue that both the first- 
and the second-generation models are inadequate for under-
standing the complexities of the Asian crisis. Specifically, the 
models overlook two factors that figured importantly in the 
1990s: the role of the banking and financial sectors and the 
international transmission of crises. The authors incorporate 
these factors in a more synthetic view of the Asian crisis that 
suggests that policy weaknesses and self-fulfilling investor 
expectations were at play in the crisis. Consider, for example, 
a country in which a poorly supervised banking system raises 
investor expectations of future government spending to cover 
bad loans. Even though the current fiscal deficit may be small, 
market expectations shift toward larger future fiscal deficits, 
putting immediate pressure on the country’s exchange rate.  
A closer look at the role of the banking and financial sectors 
in emerging economies is provided by the second article in the 
volume, by B. Gerard Dages, Linda Goldberg, and Daniel 
Kinney. The authors begin by acknowledging the important 
and sometimes heated debate in emerging markets about the 
appropriate structure and ownership of local banking systems. 
Many economists maintain that opening the financial sectors 
of emerging market countries to foreign ownership boosts 
funding for domestic projects and improves the quality and 
pricing of financial services. Others contend, however, that 
foreign-owned financial institutions will destabilize domestic 
bank credit and crowd local institutions out of the most 
lucrative domestic markets. 
Pursuing the theme of foreign participation, the authors 
observe that in the Asian countries hit hardest by the financial 
crisis, foreign-owned banks had few direct roles in the local 
economies. Yet the fact that emerging markets as a group have 
increasingly been opening their financial sectors to foreign 
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bank participation leads the authors to suggest that the 
experiences of these countries may provide some relevant 
crisis-management lessons for the future. 
With this in mind, Dages, Goldberg, and Kinney narrow 
their focus to Argentina and Mexico—two countries with a 
significant foreign bank presence—and compare the behavior 
of foreign banks with that of domestic banks over the course 
of the 1990s. The authors find that foreign banks in these 
countries showed stronger and less volatile loan growth than 
domestic banks, and that diversity in bank ownership helped 
produce greater stability in times of crisis. Although the 
authors emphasize that individual bank health, rather than 
bank ownership per se, emerges as the most important factor 
in determining the growth, volatility, and cyclicality of bank 
credit in Argentina and Mexico, they see the effects of foreign 
bank participation in the financial systems of these countries as 
essentially positive. 
A close examination of the export and import performance 
of the Asia crisis economies is provided in the article by 
Matthew Higgins and Thomas Klitgaard. The authors begin by 
observing that the swing from large inflows of capital in these 
countries to large outflows required a corresponding improve-
ment in each country’s current account balance. A review of 
imports and exports in dollar terms reveals that almost all of 
the improvement in the current accounts stemmed from lower 
imports. 
As the authors note, however, this finding does not imply 
that the export activities of the crisis countries were unaffected. 
By breaking down the trade flows into their dollar price and 
volume components, the authors show that large adjustments 
occurred in both the import and the export trade volumes of 
Asian economies. Import volumes fell with the collapse of 
domestic demand in the wake of the crisis. At the same time, 
export volumes rose because demand in areas outside of Asia 
continued to show strong growth. The reason that dollar 
exports appear flat in the data is that the increase in export 
volume was offset by the decline in export prices in dollar 
terms. A similar decline in import prices accentuated the 
decline in imports in dollar terms.
In their examination of the price component of trade flows, 
Higgins and Klitgaard attach considerable significance to the 
fact that dollar import and export prices fell together, with both 
tracking world prices. This pattern leads the authors to 
conclude that exchange-rate-induced price changes did not 
play a large direct role in the improvement of the crisis 
countries’ current account balances.
In the fourth article in the volume, Eric van Wincoop and 
Kei-Mu Yi analyze the effects of the Asian currency crisis on 
noncrisis countries. While most earlier studies of such effects 
focus on how currency devaluation and economic recession in 
the crisis countries influence trade balances with other nations, 
this article explores the sharp outflows of capital that originally 
prompted the devaluation of the Asian currencies.
Tracking the capital flows out of Asia, the authors find that 
most of the capital was moved through the world banking 
system. More than half of the outflows went first to offshore 
center banks and then to banks in Europe. Although subse-
quent movements are more difficult to trace, van Wincoop 
and Yi argue that much of the capital eventually reached the 
United States. 
The authors then assess the effects of this reallocation of 
capital from Asia to the United States. The flow of capital into 
this country contributed to lower interest rates and hence 
encouraged domestic demand growth. On the supply side, the 
appreciation of the dollar against the Asian currencies lowered 
the cost of imported intermediate goods, generating a positive 
effect on the economy similar to the effect of lower oil prices. 
The rise in the dollar also led, of course, to a deterioration in 
the U.S. trade balance. Taking all three of these effects into 
consideration, the authors calculate that the overall effect of the 
Asian crisis on the U.S. economy was small but positive. As 
van Wincoop and Yi observe, a narrower inquiry into the trade 
balance effects of the crisis would, by contrast, have under-
scored the negative effects of the crisis on U.S. producers.
Calculating the costs and benefits of the Asian financial 
crisis for an industrialized country such as the United States 
also involves consideration of the impact of trade adjustments 
on particular local industries. The final article of the volume, 
by James Harrigan, examines how the large devaluations 
experienced by Korea, Malaysia, Thailand, and Indonesia 
affected the traded goods industries in the United States. The 
author contends that U.S. exporters were largely unhurt by the 
devaluations. Although export sales to Asia dropped, strong 
domestic demand and continued exports to other foreign 
markets kept the crisis from significantly reducing the growth 
of shipments by U.S. industries. 
On the import side, the drop in the price of goods produced 
in Asia did not, with the major exception of steel, lead to a surge 
in imports. This unexpected outcome holds an important 
lesson about the direct distributional consequences of an 
emerging market crisis. Because U.S. firms for the most part 
did not compete directly with Asian imports, they did not lose 
domestic sales to these goods. Instead, Harrigan concludes, the 
U.S. economy may have realized a net benefit from the Asian 
crisis, since the crisis lowered the costs of imported inputs 
without eroding the position of most U.S. industries relative 
to their major foreign competitors.